Abstract: Ship-to-ship (STS) transfer of cargo operations suffers inherently from risks that can compromise the success of such operations, leading to an accident with adverse effects on human lives and the environment. A feasible way to tackle the risks of STS transfers is through the use of multicriteria decision aid (MCDA) methodologies. This paper aims to develop an MCDA model to evaluate risks of an STS transfer based on the outranking relation concept. The proposed methodology uses confidence indices to compare alternative risk scenarios on stochastic risk criteria evaluation. To do so, a team of experts evaluate the scenarios regarding three risk factors; the likelihood of a scenario to occur, the severity of the scenario and the ability to detect the risk on time. Next, fuzzy domination relation is applied to complete the ranking of the risks. Finally, robustness analysis is performed to control the model's stability.
Introduction
The transfer of cargo between seagoing ships is a demanding and complex operation that needs special consideration from the preliminary planning to the final execution. The transferred cargo differs from oil and oily products, liquefied gases (LNG or LPG), to solid bulk cargoes such as ore (OCIMF, 2013) . With respect to the petroleum products, the origins of the 'lightering' operation can be found in the decade of 1960s due to limitations coming from of the design of large ships (very large or ultra large crude carriers). These large vessels were unable to access specific oil terminals through shallow rivers in the Gulf of Mexico (NAS, 1998) . As for liquefied gases, the operation origins back in 1964 when the world's first commercial LNG plant in the Algerian port city of Arzew started delivering gas to the UK for a 15-year contract (Gorstenko and Tikhomolova, 2012) . Since then, the ship-to-ship (STS) transfer operations have been shifting and changing due to different reasons of operational and trading nature, all in the context of optimising the distribution plan between the commodity source and the final consumers (Ventikos and Stavrou, 2013) . Nowadays that oil remains the world's leading fuel, at 33.1% of the global energy consumption and the natural gas accounts for 23.9% of primary energy consumption (BP, 2013 ) the STS transfers continuously develop in different matters regarding safety or procedural issues under a strict and demanding legislative context enforced by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Resolution MEPC 186(59)/2009, which standardises such procedures.
The STS transfer of cargo operations suffers inherently from risks that can compromise the success of such operations. The origins of these risks can be located in several factors, to name a few: the need to deal with the complex and many times hostile sea environment where the operation is conducted; the human element due to the unavoidable possibility of error during the procedures; the potential failure of the means to conduct the operation, including the vessels or the additional equipment during the operation. The risks can compromise the success of the marine operation and may lead to an accident with adverse effects on human lives or the environment in combination with the loss of property. There are many definitions of risk in maritime operations. An analytical discussion is presented by Goerlandt and Montewka (2015) , as well as, from Aven (2012) . Concerning the latter risk definitions, two basic features can be addressed:
1 their relation to the factors of occurrence and the consequence of a failure 2 the dependence of risk on uncertainty.
In addition, to the first feature, Stavrou and Ventikos (2015a , 2015b , 2015c highlighted the importance of another factor, named detectability. Detectability is a new risk factor that refers to the ability to detect a risk in time to prevent it from happening. With regard to the uncertainty, we mainly focus on epistemic uncertainty, which refers to the lack of knowledge about system operational parameters and can be found in errors or limitations during the process of collecting data. This type of uncertainty is tolerable which means that more observations or experiences lead to more information and consequently to less level of uncertainty (Compton et al., 2009) . From the definition of epistemic uncertainty, it can be inferred that the risk factors have an element of uncertainty themselves inherently.
Α feasible way to tackle uncertainty is through the use of multicriteria decision aid (MCDA) methodologies under uncertainty. Examples of MCDA applications under uncertainty can be found in the work of Siskos et al. (1984) where a fuzziness modelling was developed by the integration of fuzzy outranking relations into a dominance structure, the work of Keeney and Raiffa (1976) who introduced the multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) under uncertainty and the work of Martel and D'Avignon (1982) who proposed the use of confidence indices; Nevertheless the need to cope with uncertainty in a more effective way led researchers to seek for more sophisticated tools to overcome the impreciseness and ambiguity of a system. In this context, it was Zadeh (1965) , who initially introduced fuzzy theory as a remedy to ill-defined systems suffering from uncertainty. Fuzziness has the unique ability to interfere with objective and perceptive human reality, by solving problems through a more human way of thinking. The fuzzy theory was successfully combined with MCDA methodologies, and many relative works have been published. An extensive overview of the fuzzy MCDA applications can be found in the work of Ashari Alias et al. (2008) as well as in the work of Mardani et al. (2015) .
This paper focuses on a stochastic approach inspired by the work of Martel and D'Avignon (1982) who used confidence indices, based on the preference relation among the decision actions concerning the selected criteria. In particular, the set of actions refers to a set of different risk scenarios regarding the STS transfer operation, whereas the selected criteria correspond to three risk factors of evaluation; the occurrence, the severity and the detectability. The outranking relation is the result of the pairwise comparison of the different risk scenarios. Hence, the proposed methodology uses confidence indices to compare alternative actions on a predefined consistent family of criteria. Moreover, the concept of fuzzy domination relation, borrowed from Siskos and Hubert (1983) , is applied to complete the ranking of the risks. Lastly, the relative importance (weights) of the selected criteria is determined using a mathematical programming process.
To apply the proposed methodology, different risk scenarios regarding the operation are composed and evaluated regarding three different risk factors: the likelihood of a failure occurring, the severity of the failure, and the ability to detect the failure on time. The risk scenarios are assessed from a team of experts with relevant experience in such operations. Also, a robustness analysis is performed to control the stability of the proposed model.
The aim of this paper is to develop a model to assess and evaluate different risks of a maritime operation based on the outranking relation among the risk factors that affect the activity. To do so, the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives the general steps of the implemented methodology; Section 3 refers to the implementation of the proposed methodology by applying the example of an STS transfer operation; In Section 4 the results are presented, and robustness analysis is performed to control the stability of the model. Section 5 gives the discussion and finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Risk assessment methodological framework
The general context of the proposed methodology is shown in Figure 1 . The first step of the methodological approach consists of the system's identification. The different phases of the operation are thoroughly examined and analysed with the objective to identify the risks or the critical points of the process that can compromise the success of the operation. The next step is to determine the risk factors or criteria that affect the operation, as well as, the construction of scales on the criteria to support the evaluation process. The scales can combine both qualitative characteristics such as linguistic terms, and quantitative components are providing to the experts a user-friendly interface to conduct the evaluation of the risks. The risk factors are the likelihood of a risk to occur, the impact of the risk to the human beings, to the environment and the property, and the detectability which refers to the ability to detect a risk in time. Next comes the composition of different risk scenarios which are analysed and evaluated regarding the three risk parameters. The experts evaluate both the risk scenarios as well as the risk factors to elicit their relative importance (weights of the risk factors). Following, the MCDA methodology is applied to the risk scenarios concerning the weights of the different risk factors and the final ranking of the risks is extracted. Finally, to control the stability of the model, robustness analysis is performed taking into account the ranges of the risk factors weights. 
Modelling of the STS transfer operation
The STS transfer operations refer to the transfer of cargo between seagoing ships positioned site by site. An STS transfer operation can be conducted either stationary or underway; the operation comprises four consecutive phases (OCIMF, 2013) : the phase of preparation when certain conditions, requirements or pre-fixture information related to the compatibility assessment of the vessels involved in the STS transfer operation should be met. Next is the mooring phase in which the one vessel approaches the other conducting the 'run-in' procedure with the objective both vessels to come on parallel courses, with similar speed and their manifolds in line to proceed with the transfer phase in which the actual transfer of the cargo is conducted. Finally, there is the unmooring phase, where the two vessels separate from each other after the transfer is completed. A typical STS transfer operation between two tankers is shown in Figure 2 . 
Risk identification of STS transfers
The adverse effects of a potential accident led several studies to focus on risk scenarios regarding the STS operations; to this end, guidelines and recommendations made by international organisations (OCIMF, 2013; IMO MERC, 2010) as well as papers/studies of independent researchers (Østvik and Grønstøl, 2005; Skjong et al., 2007; Elsayed et al., 2013) addressed the most probable high-level risks during an STS operation:
• A collision between the involved vessels: In authors' previous work (Ventikos and Stavrou, 2013 ) the significance of the risk of collision/contact between the vessels involved in the STS transfer operation was highlighted through examples from past accidents. Moreover, a rough analysis of Marine (2004) on 1270 STS transfer operations addressed collision as the risk with the highest rate of all accidents. In the case of a high-energy collision, the effects may be significant equipment damage, fatalities and loss of containment for the oil.
• Fire on the deck or/and explosion: According to the literature relevant to STS cargo operations (Østvik and Grønstøl, 2005; Skjong et al., 2007) , the ignition or even explosion during a transfer procedure is also a prevailing threat. Fire and/or explosion may result in personnel fatalities or injuries, and/or structural damages of the vessels involved in the STS transfer operation.
• Cargo leakage: A common STS transfer operation is usually carried out with two hoses of 10'' in diameter and typically 24 m in length. Oil is transferred at a rate of typically 2,000 m 3 /h (COWI, 2011). A potential accident on the transfer line may lead to serious pollution through leakage at sea or a large amount of oil-on-board in the case of leakage on deck. Both risks can occur during the transfer of cargo due to operational reasons such as inadequate training, procedures, inadequate experience, fatigue, abnormal weather conditions, inadequate equipment (inspection, testing, maintenance), technical reasons, etc.; for example, inadequate equipment for level measurement and overfill protection systems for open water operation, high transfer rate, defective overfill protection; it leads to adverse environmental effects (Stavrou and Ventikos, 2015c ). An oil spill as a result of cargo leakage can result in adverse environmental effects. A cargo leakage on deck may lead to fatalities or personnel injury, ignition with an explosion, and hull damages.
• Human injury/fatality: It can occur either during personnel transfer or mooring operations. Accidents during personnel transfer are associated with procedures related to personnel transfer prior and after the entire operation; the personnel can be the crew, the mooring masters, the surveyors, the agents or the customs officials. An accident during personnel transfer may lead to severe injuries or even to fatalities. On the other hand, accidents during mooring operations are relevant to the mooring and unmooring procedure. These kinds of accidents can be attributed to human error or equipment failure.
• Damage to cargo tanks: The guideline of OCIMF (2013) refers to the risk of structural damages to cargo tanks during the phase of the cargo transfer due to environmental factors (e.g. abnormal weather conditions), improper equipment used for tanks' level measurement and overfill protection systems for open water operation, inadequate contingency planning, or management that leads to property damages.
A comprehensive reference to the severeness of the high-level risks about certain accidents during STS transfer of cargo operations that was presented by the authors in a previous work (see ref. Ventikos and Stavrou, 2013) .
MCDA modelling of STS transfers
In MCDA modelling under uncertainty, a set of risk scenarios A = {a 1 , a 2 ,…,a m } is evaluated based on a consistent family of criteria/risk factors F = {g 1 , g 2 ,…g j …,g n } under the assumption that each criterion g i evaluates each scenario a i by means of a discrete probability distribution . 
where g 1* is the worst value of the criterion and * i g is the best value of the criterion respectively, the j i δ represents the probability that the scenario a i takes the value j i g on the i th criterion. Thus, the following equation (1) holds for each criterion i:
Following the method of Martel and D'Avignon (1982) , this paper proposes a model based on the preference ranking of a set of scenarios using two indices called confidence index and doubt index. More specifically, the model consists of four different steps:
Step 1 For each criterion g i and every pair of scenarios (a, b) ∈ A × A the confidence and doubt indices are calculated. The confidence index shows the degree of credibility of the outranking of b by a on each criterion. It refers to the relative frequency of evaluations for the criterion j i g that is at least as high for the scenario a as it is for the scenario b. The range of values of the degree of credibility is between 0 and 1; value 1 is when the lowest evaluation of scenario a on the criterion j i g is higher or equal to the highest evaluation of scenario b to the same criterion .
The doubt index expresses the degree on average scale in which the experts evaluate scenario a higher than scenario b about the criterion . ( ) ( ) ( )
Step 2 Under the assumption that the contribution of each criterion to the scenario's evaluation is not equal to all criteria, the relative importance (weight) of the criteria k 1 , k 2 ,…,k n is determined by the use of mathematical programming. The aggregation of the weights should be equal to one.
Next, the total confidence index is calculated by the use of the weight of each criterion:
The total confidence index C(a, b) expresses the normalised concordance of the criteria with regard to the outranking of scenario a against scenario b.
Step 3 The degree of global credibility of the outranking is calculated for the pairs of scenarios using the combination of the confidence and doubt index:
Step 4 According to the matrix of the degrees of global credibility of the outranking, the fuzzy domination relation (Siskos and Hubert, 1983; Siskos et al., 1984 ) is applied to compare the different pairs of scenarios to determine the outranking intensity between each pair of scenarios:
From equation (6), it can be inferred that for an action
is the fuzzy set of scenarios a ∈ A that are dominated by scenario b. Following, the fuzzy non-domination relation can be determined:
is the fuzzy set of scenarios a ∈ A that they are not dominated by b. Thus, the cross of the fuzzy sets for the actions b ∈ A will result in a set of scenarios that they are not dominated by any other scenario of A. The latter set of scenarios is named the non-dominated set of scenarios μ ND : A → [0, 1] and is determined as follows:
where μ ND (a) refers to the non-domination degree of scenario a by the other scenarios of set A. The final ranking of the actions according to problematic-γ, in which the actions are placed in order from the best to the worst, can be accomplished by the use of the fuzzy non-domination relation. In particular, the best action is the one with the highest value of the non-fuzzy domination relation.
For the needs of our study the risk scenarios T i and M j corresponds to the aforementioned set of risk scenarios A = {a 1 , a 2 ,…,a m }, whereas the risk factors of the likelihood, the severity and the detectability (O, S and D) corresponds to the consistent family of criteria/risk factors F = {g 1 , g 2 ,…g j …,g n }.
The selection process of the risk scenarios
The risk scenarios were composed after taking into account several guidelines, recommendations and other studies relevant to the activity (Skjong et al., 2007; IMO MERC, 2010; OCIMF, 2013) . They form the result of narrated descriptions of causes and effects from different circumstances that may be combined and lead to an unfortunate event called an 'accident'. They have been successfully applied to solve MCDA problems in previous studies (Islei et al., 1999; Schoemaker, 1995; Van der Heijden, 1996; Durbach, 2014) due of their ability to give to the decision-makers a good understanding of the problem at hand and to unusual insights into possible courses of action (Durbach and Stewart, 2012) . In this study, the inference technique to build the risk scenarios comes from Ford's (2004) handbook. The flowchart diagram of the inference technique is shown in Figure 3 . In a first step a team of experts of relevant experience to STS transfer operations namely three masters, an STS superintendent and one from insurance company agreed to survey, grade and subsequently rank for each scenario its likelihood (occurrence number), impact (severity number) and detection (detection number) through predefined scales. The experts evaluated the risk scenarios under the assumption that weather conditions and sea stage were permitting the conduction of the transfer operation. To this end, 43 risk scenarios were analysed and evaluated (Stavrou and Ventikos, 2014 , 2015a , 2015b . In this paper, the proposed methodology is applied to 13 out of the 43 risk scenarios on the most probable high-level risks regarding the STS operation. For reasons of simplicity, a short identification number, namely T i for risk scenarios during the transfer process and M j for the scenarios during the mooring/unmooring procedure, is used, hereafter, with respect to each scenario. In particular, with regard to the mooring/unmooring phase, M7 refers to inadequate fendering resulting in low energy collision and physical damage to ships. M9 refers to a pilotage error resulting in high energy collision and personnel injury or fatality. M12 is about inadequate communication resulting in low energy collision and physical damage to ships. M14 contains the inadequate procedures resulting in high energy collision and personnel injury or fatality. M21 deals with the inadequate planning for emergency breakaway resulting in low energy collision and physical damage to one or both ships. M22 refers to tug/support vessel failure resulting in low energy collision leading to significant equipment damage, fatalities, and loss of containment. M24 is about mooring equipment failure resulting in low energy collision and physical damage to ships. M26 concludes fatigue during mooring/unmooring procedures resulting in low energy collision and physical damage to one or both ships. On the other hand there are the risk scenarios regarding the transfer process. T28 refers to inadequate procedures resulting in the loss of containment and vapour release leading to ignition back to source resulting in fatalities or injuries and/or hardware and steelwork damage. T29 which is related to inadequate experience resulting in the loss of containment and/or vapour release leading to ignition back to source resulting in fatalities or injuries and/or hardware and steelwork damage. T30 refers to fatigue during transfer resulting in the loss of containment and/or vapour release leading to ignition back to source resulting in fatalities or injuries and/or hardware and steelwork damage. T35 represents the different roll periods during transfer phase resulting in the loss of containment and/ or vapour release leading to ignition back to source resulting in fatalities or injuries and/or hardware and steelwork damage. Finally, the T39 is about damaged mooring due to chafing and cyclic loading during transfer resulting in the loss of containment leading to vapour collection in a confined space, leading to ignition with explosion causing fatalities, injury and hull damage.
Evaluation of risk scenarios
The scales used for the evaluation of the occurrence number, the severity number, and the detection number are shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The scales come from IMO's guidelines, and they are previously applied successfully to other similar efforts (Østvik and Grønstøl, 2005; Skjong et al., 2007) . The occurrence number refers to the likelihood of a potential risk scenario to occur; the severity number refers to the impact of the accident with regards to the people, the environment, and even the property. The detection number for the implementation of the PFMEA refers to the ability of detection technique(s) or method(s) to detect the problem (Carbone and Tippett, 2004) . These techniques or methods are related to each particular risk scenario. For example, M26 and T30 refer to fatigue during the mooring/unmooring and the transfer process accordingly. There are standardised methods that can give a clear picture of the physical tiredness of the personnel involved. The documentations that refer to the working hours of the person overall advisory control (POAC) which is responsible for coordinating the operation can give valuable information regarding the resting and work hours of the person before conducting the STS operation. Moreover, the master can also have a clear picture regarding the resting and working hours of his crew. Thus, the experts when evaluating the fatigue scenarios, they have a good idea of the ways that fatigue can be diagnosed and prevented. On the other hand, the scenario M22 that refers to tug/support vessel failure has a different interpretation of the detectability according to the instruments that can give a warning about a mechanical failure. Thus, the detection method is related to each risk scenario, and the experienced experts have to evaluate the detection method accordingly.
Table 1
Scale of the occurrence number rate There is no detection method available or known that will provide an alert with enough time to plan for a contingency.
7 or 8 Detection method is unproven or unreliable; or effectiveness of detection method is unknown to detect in time.
5 or 6 Detection method has medium effectiveness.
3 or 4 Detection method has moderately high effectiveness.
1 or 2 Detection method is highly effective and it is almost certain that the risk will be detected with adequate time. Next, each predefined scale was divided equally to three consecutive portions/areas, and the expert's evaluations of each risk scenario on each criterion were distributed accordingly. The transition from the experts' crisp values to the distribution evaluation is presented for all risk scenarios in Table 4 . For example, scenario M7 on the likelihood distribution evaluation accounts for 0% of expert's evaluations in the first scale area (0-2.66), 80% of the values remains in the second scale area (2.67-5.33) and, 20% of the values remains in the third scale area (5.34-8). According to the model algorithm, the equations (1) and (2) from the first step process are applied. The results of the confidence (degree of credibility of the outranking of b by a on each criterion) and doubt matrixes (the degree on the average scale in which the experts evaluate scenario a higher than scenario b concerning a certain criterion) are shown in Table 6 .
Importance weights elicitation
During the second step, the relative importance (weight) of the criteria is calculated. That said, the experts were asked to evaluate on an aggregated level using linguistic terms (medium, high and very high), the relative importance of the three risk factors (O, S, D). The corresponding results are shown in Table 5a . To transform the linguistic terms used for the three risk factors (O, S, and D) to crisp values the following scale is assumed (with the various levels related in a linear way): the medium importance equals a/2; high importance equals a, and very high importance equals 2a. Hence, each expert provides, based on his/her experience, his/her overall view of the relative importance among the three risk factors (the aggregation of the three evaluations equals one), regardless of the specifics of scenarios and situations; as, for example, this metric for the expert 'Exp3' is given below: Table 6 Matrices of confidence and doubt indices (continued) The transformation results are presented in Table 5b . After the calculation of the weight of the risk factors, the total confidence index C(a, b) matrix is constructed as shown in Table 7 (a). Moreover, the degree of global credibility from Step 3 is calculated for the pairs of actions, and the relative matrix is depicted in Table 7 (b). Finally, in
Step 4 the fuzzy domination relation is applied to compare the different pairs of actions to determine the outranking intensity between each pair of actions. The equation (6) is applied, and the results are shown in Table 7 (c).
Results and robustness analysis
The results from the implemented methodology are shown in Table 8 . The first column shows the ranking of the risk scenarios concerning the average weights of the risk factors. The remaining columns show the results from different combinations of the weight factors according to the experts' evaluation in Table 5a .
Table 8
Matrix of the ranking of actions concerning the min-max weight limitations of the risk factors M22 M22 T29  T29  T29  T29 M22 M22 T29 M22 M22   2  T29  T35  T35 M22 M22 M22 M22 T35  T29 M22 T35  T35   3  T35  T29  T29  T30  T30  T35  T35  T29  T35  T30  T29  T29   4  T30  T30  T30  T35  T35  T30  T30  T30  T30  T35  T30  T30   5  M24 M24 M24 T39  M9  T39  T39 M24 M24  M9  M24 M24   6  T39 M26 T39  M9  M14 M24 M24 T39  M9  M14 T39  T39   7  M26 T39 M26 M24 M24  M9  M9  M26 T39 M24 M26 M26   8  M9  M9  M9  M14 T28 M26 M26  M9  M26 T28  M9  M9   9  M21 M21 M21 T28  T39 M21 M21 M21 M21 M12 M21 M21   10 M14 M12 M12 M26 M12 M14 M12 M12 M12 T39 M12 M12   11 M12  M7  M7  M21 M21 M12  M7  M7  T28 M21  M7  M7   12  M7  T28 M14 M12 M26 T28  T28  T28 M14 M26 M14 M14   13  T28 M14 T28  M7  M7  M7  M14 M14  M7  M7  T28  T28 Durbach and Stewart (2012) addressed the importance of the weight calculation of the selected factors in their study. Moreover, in the work of Siskos et al. (1984) , the need to identify the tendencies coming from the fluctuation of the weight of the criteria and to alternatively favour one or another is properly highlighted. Many methods have been previously proposed to determine the weights of the criteria; for example, someone can see Figueira and Roy (2002) , Tervonen et al. (2012) , Vansnick (1986) and the recent survey conducted by Siskos and Tsotsolas (2015) . To conduct the analysis in a more objective way (covering all preferences of the experts' opinion) the range of the weight of each criterion on the values/limitations coming from the other criteria is determined.
Next, the algorithm of Section 3.2 is applied from the entire range of the weights of the risk factors to verify and control the stability of the model. In particular, we 'run' the model irritatingly 12 times to cover the ensemble of the different weight combinations of the risk factors. The results from the implementation of the algorithm for the different combinations of the weight criteria are presented in Figure 4 where the ranking of the risk scenarios concerning the total range of the weight of the risk factors is depicted. The results demonstrate the stability of the model and the accurate evaluation of the risks of the STS operation.
Discussion
The manipulation of the uncertainty of maritime activities is a complex and difficult problem that needs special consideration from the initial design to the model implementation. In this context, the aim of this study was to develop a model for ranking risks of maritime activity with a special focus on the STS transfer operation. The proposed model uses confidence indices to compare alternative actions whereas fuzzy domination relation was applied to complete the ranking of the risks. At a first glance, it can be inferred that the model achieves the primary goals it is set to do. The objective target was the treatment of the uncertainty coming from experts' opinion regarding different risk scenarios of the STS transfer operation. To do so, the experts used scales with linguistic terms, a method borrowed from the fuzzy logic, to evaluate the selected high-level risks. On the one hand, the use of fuzzy logic managed to bridge the gap between objective and human perceptive reality. Next, the diversity of the opinions was adequately treated by the use of the confidence and doubt indices where the degree of credibility of the outranking relation between the different risk scenarios was presented.
Another remark comes from the weight calculation. It is well known that the weight estimation of each criterion in essential when outranking relation models are applied. The use of the perceived relative importance among the three risk factors/criteria (O, S, and D) yields more reliable results than just assuming equal weighting or crisp values for all factors. In this study the weight estimation was performed through the use of a mathematical formula in which each expert provided, based on his experience, his overall view of the relative importance of the three risk factors (the aggregation of the three evaluations was equal one in a linear), regardless of the specifics of scenarios and situations. To solve the problem in a more realistic way, the weight of each criterion was considered as variable with a range from minimum to maximum expert's evaluation and robustness analysis was performed to control the stability of the model for the weight fluctuations. Thus, the implemented model can give rational solutions, rather than the typical deterministic approach that someone expects when trying to estimate weights with formal precision.
Moreover, the obtained results indicate that: • An important observation from the results comes from scenario M26, which refers to fatigue during mooring/unmooring procedures. For high values of the importance of detectability (D > 0.41) fatigue is a prominent factor (in seventh place), while for low values of detectability, the risk of fatigue is underestimated. Taking into consideration that the detectability has values under 0.40 in 9 of the 12 cases, it is obvious that the important issue of the risk from fatigue is properly addressed in the model.
• Another interesting remark comes from the appearance of inadequate procedures (M14) during the mooring/unmooring phases. It seems that for high values of detectability (D > 0.46) the risk ranking between 10 and 12 places, whereas for lower values of detectability (0.25 < D < 0.36) the risk take places from 6 to 8. The effect of detectability, in this case, indicates that the model gives rational results.
• Risk emerging during the transfer procedure (T29, T35, T30, T39) seems to be more considerable rather than those related to the mooring/unmooring procedure. This indicates that the transfer process should be dealt with extreme caution and special consideration.
• Inadequate experience (T29) of the personnel involved in the transfer process is also a significant factor. The fact that this risk has a medium level of detectability means that it is important to develop methods to detect in an early stage the gaps of knowledge or to conduct drills to enhance the training level.
Conclusions
Risk evaluation of maritime activities is at the top of the agenda in the shipping business. The MCDA techniques are an efficient tool in the hands of experts to help operators to compose the true picture regarding the safety of a marine activity and the potential threats that could compromise the success of the operation. This paper proposed a combination of MCDA methods, which includes initially the outranking approach and next the fuzzy domination relation. The objective goal is the modelling of the experts' judgments under uncertainty. In particular, three risk factors were selected as the criteria to evaluate risk scenarios; the occurrence and the consequences of a failure as well as the ability to detect a failure on time. The inherent uncertainty of these factors is expressed by the probability distribution of the experts' evaluation for each risk criterion. The model of outranking approach under uncertainty, borrowed from the MCDA discipline, can give reliable and positive results when evaluating risks of maritime activities. Moreover, limitations in the number of actions come from the model implementation due to computational complexity. Thus, in the case of multiple sets of actions, alternative methodologies should be taken into account. Nevertheless, for a small number of actions the proposed methodology can work effectively on risk evaluation of maritime activities.
